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Introduction: Shakespeare’s “discourse of disability”
Disability, Health, and Happiness in the Shakespearean Body puts into conversation early modern and postmodern ideals of health, vigor, ability, beauty, well-being, and happiness. These essays debate our own notions of health and fitness through an interrogation of the different ways that early modern bodies engaged with the world. The “Shakespearean body” includes not only bodies in Shakespeare but also bodies that read, perform, and critique the plays, poems, and cultural phenomena that we associate with the name. The volume raises and attempts to answer a series of questions about the history of the body and how early modern cultures understand physical ability or vigor; emotional competence or satisfaction; and joy or self-fulfillment. 
In addition, the volume integrates two relatively new disciplines, Health Studies and Happiness Studies, by investigating and to a certain extent critiquing our own pursuit of both health and happiness. Health Studies develops from Disability Studies, which analyzes both disability and able-bodiedness as social and historical categories. Henri Stiker’s A History of Disability historicizes the development of what has been called the medical model of disability. In the most extreme forms of the medical model, persons with disabilities were considered unfit, nature’s mistakes, worth consideration only insofar as they could be “corrected” and returned to conventional normalcy and functioning within society. Disability, Health, and Happiness in the Shakespearean Body, which considers embodiment and selfhood in the present day and in the early modern era alongside each other, draws from the post-medicalized versions of Disability Studies. These schools of thought treat persons with disabilities as whole subjects, sublime, earthly, perfect, flawed, fully human beings with the capacities for experiencing both good and evil impulses, joy and sorrow, exquisite pleasure and excruciating pain.
UK sociologist Tom Shakespeare (to avoid confusion with William Shakespeare, I refer to “Tom Shakespeare” by his first name and last name throughout) taxonomizes the post-medical development of Disability Studies into three categories: the “strong social model,” the “cultural disabilities studies” model; and finally his own “social realist” model. The social model (as summarized by Tom Shakespeare) distinguishes between “impairment” (an empirical, bodily attribute that differs from what is considered normal or healthy) and “disability” (the social consequences of that impairment). In other words, it argues that while persons might be born or acquire through illness or accident particular impairments, society alone creates disability. The “social model of disability” might be typified by activists and writers such as the late Harriet McBryde Johnson, activist lawyer and member of the disabled-rights movement “Not Dead Yet,” who argued that a truly enlightened society would offer to persons called disabled by the able-bodied world the tools, help, and staff they needed in order to fulfill their intellectual, physical, and ethical potential, rather than defining such persons by and through their constraints. Not Dead Yet sounds a clarion call to us to respect and enable the lives of persons with disabilities in their fullest senses, intellectual, social, and sexual, rather than on the one hand attempting to “correct” certain conditions or constraints and on the other dismissing the rights and privileges of different kinds of bodies and minds when those bodies cannot be easily, surgically, or pharmaceutically “cured.” McBryde’s own life was exemplary: living with a progressive neuro-muscular disorder that constrained her physical mobility and necessitated constant help from an attendant, she eloquently discussed and materially demonstrated her full engagement and enjoyment of physical, intellectual, and social life, and her refusal of so-called corrective procedures. Not Dead Yet asserts the full human rights – to food, shelter, employment, mobility, sociability – of all persons, including those with physical and mental conditions that require help from other human beings and from the societies in which they live (in other words, the group that we now call “disabled”). 
Critics question, however, the social model’s dichotomy between “impairment” (physical limitations as understood by a medical model) and “disability” (the social conditions that turn impairment into inability by failing to provide for the impaired person’s mobility, health, or activity). It is more helpful, they suggest, to imagine that impairment and disability are interactive, to acknowledge that some impairments are inherently disabling, and to recognize that many persons with disabilities live with chronic pain, recurrent infections, and restricted mobility or cognitive functions (even as we try to avoid creating a hierarchy of ills and claiming that some persons deserve more than others to be called “disabled”). Moreover, observes Tom Shakespeare, the goal of equalizing opportunities, although laudable, cannot be applied to “Nature.” To make the natural world accessible to all would be impossible: as a wheelchair user and a person with paraplegia, he is unlikely to ascend Mount Everest (and neither, for that matter, are most of the able-bodied, or most of his or our readers). He extends an argument that Peter Coleridge, Lennard Davis, and many in the disabled-rights movement have already mounted that calls for the able-bodied to imagine themselves as “the not-yet-disabled” (Coleridge 215) or the “Temporarily-Able-Bodied” (Davis 36). 
Tom Shakespeare’s notion of universal impairment, however, seems to turn the idea of even temporary able-bodiedness into non-existent able-bodiedness by extending the notions of temporary able-bodiedness and impairment to all bodies; both the so-called disabled and the Temporarily Able-Bodied are always impaired. He suggests that we move from imagining that we inhabit a world in which only persons with disabilities suffer from impairments to acknowledging that “everyone is impaired” (86) and that from time to time we find ourselves in a “predicament.” His “critical realist” model of disabilities is “interactional” (75), he writes, a framework that “do[es] not explain disability as impairment, and [does not] see impairment as determining” (75). For example, he found that
the main effect [of his own restricted growth] in daily life was that many people stared at me.... Education may reduce but is unlikely ever to eliminate this basic curiosity. Therefore, I will always be stared at. This is not pleasant, even if people are not actually hostile. I cannot escape the awareness of my abnormal embodiment, however much I am happy and successful as an individual. But I do not think these reactions can easily be explained away as oppression. They are a fact of life, like the vulnerability to back problems that is another dimension of the impairment. (75)
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has beautifully explored the ramifications of “staring” (the title of her book on the subject) and its ambiguous relationship to power or knowledge-gathering. Distinguishing between the stare and the gaze (the latter associated in feminist criticism with the imposition of hierarchy and subordination upon those who lack power in particular cultures), she analyzes the ways in which starer and staree (her preferred terms) can, ideally, move away from on the one hand, the “baroque stare” championed in the so-called freak show or the “dominance stare” of the gaze or, on the other hand, the avoidant stare that refuses to catch the eye of another human being altogether. Instead she notes moments that highlight the mutually intelligible and compassionate exchange of stares between the “intent yet ephemeral” glances of curious starers and “the look that the [starees] return…without rebuke or hostility….a calm, constant insistence on their own humanity” (181). Both staring and being stared at become “predicaments,” in Tom Shakespeare’s terms, uncomfortable or even unpleasant, and yet part of what joins starer and staree in being human. Bill Hughes complains, however, that the revised social model advocated by Tom Shakespeare, Nicholas Watson and others neglects the existing power structures that can render miserable the lives of persons with disabilities. Hughes finds a biological determinism or reductivism in Tom Shakespeare and Watson’s arguments and responds: “The attempt...to normalize disability at an anthropological level by invoking the empirical universality of impairment ends in a sociological limbo dominated by a pre-social notion of life as limit” (678).
In cultural disabilities studies, in contrast, “[m]ateriality itself is a social process…such that cultural narratives and representations of disability have the power to shape corporeal experience even as those narratives themselves are being shaped by the material realities of non-normative bodies and minds” (Hobgood and Wood 5).  Critiquing what he calls “U.S.-style cultural disabilities studies,” in turn, Tom Shakespeare argues that this model concentrates on “rhetoric” at the expense of action or of the lived human experience. Again using himself as an example, Tom Shakespeare contrasts his earlier “predicament” as a fairly healthy person with restricted growth, to his later experiences after severe spinal cord injury:
The predicament of impairment -- the intrinsic difficulties of engaging with the world, the pains and sufferings and limitations of the body -- means that impairment is not neutral. It may bring insights and experiences that are positive, and for some these may even outweigh the disadvantages. But that does not mean that we should not try and minimise the number of people who are impaired, or the extent to which they are impaired: I would very much like to turn back the clock to before the onset of my paraplegia. (86-7)
Perhaps the dispute surrounding the power of “cultural narratives” to “shape corporeal experience” is intractable, insofar as Tom Shakespeare does inject a dose, as it were, of positivism into the conversation, colloquially summarizing his beliefs through an imagined advocate:  “‘people are disabled by society and by their bodies’” (75). His point is well taken, and we might remember Susan Sontag’s anguished insistence in Illness as Metaphor that illness or impairment cannot be understood through metaphor without diminishing the experience of the body whose world is formed this way. Yet historians of health (notably Roy Porter) have challenged Sontag’s ideal of bodily experience emptied-out of metaphor, arguing that it is through metaphor, narrative, and interaction that human beings develop selfhood in both an embodied and an intellectual sense.
Critics of the “rhetorical” cultural disabilities studies underestimate, moreover, the imaginative and socially relevant (“critical realist,” to use Tom Shakespeare’s term) work that cultural disabilities studies in its best modes can do. David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder’s elegant and thoughtful Narrative Prosthesis argues for the fundamental importance of story, metaphor, and rhetoric in shaping human sensory and material experience. In fact, they wonder whether humanities and arts scholarship that is inflected by cultural disabilities studies can bring us “closer to recapturing the ‘popular’ values of everyday lives” (43), within range of the bodily microsensations, the vivid corporeal textures, of human existence. Moreover, they argue: 
If disability is a product of an interaction between individual differences and social environments (architectural, legislative, familial, attitudinal, etc.), then the contrast between discourses of disability situates art and literature as necessary to reconstructing the dynamics of this historical interaction. (27).
As Hobgood and Wood suggest, despite “the tug of metaphor,” the cultural model actively asserts “the ways lived particularity interacts with environment, and it especially understands the meanings and consequences of disability as determined by embodiment’s interface with cultural narratives, language, and representations” (Hobgood and Wood 5). An embodied critical ontology of Disability Studies might question what it means historically and materially to be able-bodied, and most importantly, would challenge the tendency of the dominant culture to devalue persons with disabilities because of the threat that non-normative bodies present to the able-bodied self-image. It might take up Bill Hughes’s challenge to the “profoundly invalidating vision of disability that haunts the non-disabled imaginary” (682): it might, in fact, take us to the newer field of Health Studies.
Health Studies continues the process of historicizing “ableness” or able-bodiedness and queries our dominant notion that good health comprises physical autonomy, athleticism, youthfulness and beauty. Health Studies also, provocatively, observes that what we now think of as good health – freedom from disease, including chronic, non-life-threatening physical conditions and mental conditions such as depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorders – is a historically and socially bounded phenomenon. We know that earlier periods of history lived with high infant mortality, outbreaks of plague, cholera, and other infectious diseases, and chronic, then-untreatable ailments; we are less apt to notice, however, these distant cultures’ own definitions of what constituted good health. Most Christian cultures in the West subordinated both mental and physical health to moral soundness. As Stuart Clark notes in Vanities of the Eye (2009), an influential strain of early modern thinking in England and Puritan America held that so-called normal vision dazzled viewers with the physical beauties of the world and distracted them from the pursuit of inner, spiritual and godly truth. Blindness enabled insight.
The so-called able-bodied teeter only one injury, one illness away from disability; moreover, at the beginnings and the ends of our lives, every single one of us lacks physical autonomy and must rely upon the kindness and respect of others and their recognition of our capacity to experience joy and pain. Similarly, most of us are the not-yet-sick, one job loss, one collapsed hedge-fund away from having our abilities constrained, our lives controlled by medical conditions rather than by ourselves. The increased prevalence of, say, asthma – a condition known to have both genetic and environmental components – among the poor (CDC Data Brief, May 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db94.htm (​https:​/​​/​by2prd0210.outlook.com​/​owa​/​redir.aspx?C=myjwq81nikm9bDAP6de1ostgWh10cNAIhGS8n8P-kTyEukdjaXLoS3lul9xE9blZJBQjMa9c-c0.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.cdc.gov%2fnchs%2fdata%2fdatabriefs%2fdb94.htm​)) provides a set of discrepancies explicable only if we understand that social norms, rather than essential or predetermined or innate markers, determine both class and health status.
Just as Health Studies asserts that bodily conformity neither enables nor disables the positive and full range of human experience, so Happiness Studies finds that contentment or well-being does not depend upon physical vigor but upon emotional resilience. The founders of the famous longitudinal Grant Study of ageing and well-being (which tracked 268 male Harvard sophomores for over seventy years) believed in 1937 that good bodily health was essential to its subjects’ well-being as they aged. George Vaillant (who took over the study in the 1960s) found that, however, what mattered more than the misfortunes (physical and emotional) that the men in the study encountered – and certainly more than their bodily health as understood by their doctors – were their emotional resilience and ability to adapt. Daniel Gilbert has similarly found that most of us have a happiness “set-point” to which we will naturally return even after grave or incapacitating loss or injury. In some cases this process takes one to three years, but ultimately, it seems human beings adapt to their new bodies, and that those who do so most quickly and effectively possess or acquire emotional resilience, a capacious potential for happiness. Even as Gilbert and others’ prescriptions for acquiring “resilience” can be helpful for individuals, we find it important to note that no stigma should attach to those who cannot or who choose not to “bounce back” from life’s challenges, nor does emphasizing resilience and “grit” obviate our responsibility towards caring for others and their well-being. In other words, just because some wheelchair-users are as happy or happier than the so-called able-bodied, the able-bodied should not then ignore the material conditions that could turn impairment into disability (the absence of ramps or appropriate seating and aisles in buildings, and so on), nor could or should we expect persons with disabilities or non-normative bodies and minds to exhibit “happiness” if disabling material conditions are removed. Moreover, Disability, Health, and Happiness questions even the seemingly self-evident notion of “happiness” -- whether understood as good fortune or happenstance (as, Kevin Laam suggests, it was most frequently envisioned in the early modern period); intense short-lived periods of joy or ecstasy; sensory pleasure or comfort; entertainment and novelty (“fun”). Even the narrower category of self-actualization (what the Greeks might have called eudaimonia) breaks down under scrutiny, whether we believe we can achieve it through: personal activities and experience, including religious faith (what some believers might call grace); or service to others (what the Romans might have called virtus) or through adherence to a socially-valued moral code (what some secularists might call ethical living).
	A critically embodied ontology also questions our post-Enlightenment or post-Cartesian assumptions about the happiness or well-being of persons with cognitive differences. Christopher Gabbard writes movingly about his son, August, who suffered from cerebral palsy, spastic quadriplegia, cognitive impairments, and other disorders. Unable to see, move, speak, feed or toilet himself without help, for some able-bodied persons August 
triggers the fearful response of “better off dead than disabled.” Many such well-meaning people would like to put an end to August’s suffering, but they do not stop to consider whether he actually is suffering. At times he is uncomfortable, yes, but the only real pain here seems to be the pain of those who cannot bear the thought that people like August exist. (218)
So far from experiencing only “suffering” or “pain,” August could and did frequently experience pleasure and joy, laughing not only in response to physical stimuli such as tickling but also to the loving voices of his family and to the sound of favorite music.
But why turn to the early modern period to explore the ontological interface between human bodies and emotions within their material environments? Stiker’s work, and that of Michel Foucault before him, presents the humanist project itself as one that depended upon defining, characterizing, and disciplining the body. Foucault for the first time suggested that sexuality might have a “history” and that it could be discussed as constructed rather than essential, contingent rather than fixed. Norbert Elias’ classic text The Civilizing Process identifies Erasmus’ On Civility (translated into English in 1532) as part of the larger Renaissance project of establishing norms for social behavior and conversation. Erasmus begins his discourse on civility with the proper way to direct one’s gaze:
[N]at frownyng/ which is syne of crueltie / nat wa[n]ton / which is toke[n] of malapertnesse / nat wandring & rollynge / which is syne of madnesse / nat twyringe and spyeng / which is token of suspection and compasynge disceyte / nor ha[n]gyng downe which is syne of folly: nor afterwarde twynklyng with the browes/ whiche in sygne of vnstablenesse / nor making as a ma[n] astonyed (And that was noted in Socrates) nor to sharpe / a syne of malyce / nat makyng synes and profers nor besy wanton / a token of yuell chastyte: but representyng a mynde well enstabled / & amyable with honesty. Nor is it nat said with out cause of antique sage me[n] /that the eye is the seate and place of the soule. (Erasmus A3)
Erasmus almost predicts Garland-Thomson’s taxonomy of stares: dominating (the cruel frown), stimulus-driven (the pert glance), blank (the wandering eye), hostile (the spy), separated (the sharp or sidelong glance), baroque (stone-faced amazement), the goal-driven (the eager come-hither) and, perhaps, the engaged stare (the firm and amiable look). (Garland-Thomson 9). Instead of Garland-Thomson’s mutually engaged stare as the collaborative affirmation of our humanity, however, appears the metaphysical belief in the spark of divinity (the soul) or intellect (the firmly established mind) or goodness (amiability and honesty) inhabiting the body and shining out of its windowed eyes.
The ongoing scholarly process of historicizing embodiment, the senses, and the boundaries of the body continued after Elias through interventions such as Francis Barker’s The Tremulous Private Body, which historicized the idea of bodily autonomy or of “private” space, and Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter, which argued that both gender and biological sex could be found to be “discursive” or socially mediated and that the body itself provided a “variable boundary” (Bodies, sub-title; Gender 189) between self and world. Thomas Laqueur’s study Making Sex presented human sexual dimorphism as historically and socially constructed and asserted that a “one-sex” model predominated in pre-Enlightenment Europe. Carla Mazzio and David Hillman’s Body in Parts suggested that not just the body but even its organs and processes could be placed within material and historical contexts. Gail Kern Paster’s Body Embarrassed revisited the one-sex model popularized by Laqueur both to critique and to extend it, and identified the social persistence of gender through female “leakiness” or bodily fluids. The “humoral turn” in early modern body studies continued with Paster’s Humoring the Body and Mary Floyd-Wilson, Paster, and Katherine Rowe’s essay-collection, Reading the Early Modern Passions. These works all participated in what Bruce R. Smith has called historical phenomenology, the study of sensory experience in historical, material, and social context. Katharine Craik and Tanya Pollard’s recent anthology Shakespearean Sensations further locates the most fundamental human experiences and emotions within the richly nuanced material and social worlds that, they argue, both developed and were developed by those contexts.
Allison Hobgood and David Wood’s edited collection Recovering Disability in Early Modern England, and their special issue for Disability Studies Quarterly (“Disabled Shakespeares”) finally takes early modern body studies firmly into cultural disabilities studies. Hobgood and Wood’s theoretical and textual arguments are particularly helpful to scholars and readers engaging with early modern theories of disability. Hobgood and Wood write: “early modern disability studies…develops from a flexible array of historicist and presentist methodologies and textual- and performance-related concerns that work together to examine difference, selfhood, and identity in the Renaissance” (Recovering 190). Disability, Health, and Happiness in the Shakespearean Body turns to William Shakespeare’s works because of their multiple voices or polyvocality (drama, and the lyric speaker in the poems), and because of the works’ wide cultural allusiveness in their own time (the range of references within them) and their wide cultural appropriation in our time.
This expansive sense of the Shakespearean allows hearers and readers to explore very broadly questions surrounding the relationships among health and such measures of “well-being” as prosperity, employment, youthfulness, strength, peace of mind, friendships, physical comfort, and so on without restricting our analysis to a single genre. In other words, Shakespearean texts allow us to range freely among dietaries and breviaries of health, sermons on happiness, plague orders and moral philosophy, just as the plays do, and to consider health and happiness as part of a social and material network that creates what we understand as the human body and its qualities. We can investigate the changing meanings of disability, health, and happiness in Shakespeare’s era and in our own in many ways, but below I offer a case-study of Shakespeare’s use of the word “disabled” and its immediate cognates “disability” and “disabling.”
To be “disabled” in Shakespeare is to experience a physical, moral, or economic slowdown, but the word is rarely used as a participial adjective or a pre-existing or unchangeable or tragic condition; instead the verbal form clarifies disability as a temporary state conferred upon one by another’s -- or by one’s own -- actions or prejudice. The Earl of Suffolk, tongue-tied in the presence of his beautiful prisoner Margaret of Anjou, castigates himself, “Fie, de la Pole! Disable not thyself” (1 Henry VI 5.5.23). He first wonders whether he should write down his desires, since he is unable to speak them, but ultimately devises another solution: disabled by his own prior marriage from wooing Margaret on his own account, he wins her for his King. Bassanio explains his poverty to Antonio in The Merchant of Venice by explaining he has “disabled [his] estate” by overspending, or, in his own metaphor, bearing too “swelling” a “port,” walking tall, as if on his toes, until his gait has crippled him (1.1.123). Later in the play, the Prince of Morocco, one of Portia’s unsuccessful suitors, questions his own fitness to woo her but then reassures himself that “to be afeard of my deserving / Were but a weak disabling of myself” (2.7.30). Ironically, he proves to be correct that he is “disabled” in Portia’s eyes; prejudiced against his dark skin, she sighs in relief at his departure, “Let all of his complexion choose me so” (2.7.79).
When Rosalind chides the melancholy Jaques because he has “disable[d] all the benefits of [his] own country” by aping the habits of another, she similarly associates foreign origin with impairment or infirmity (As You Like It 4.1.30-31). A fuller reading might read Jaques’ melancholy as David Houston Wood reads Cassio’s drunkenness in Othello -- as a narrative prosthesis, in Mitchell and Snyder’s terms, that compensates for a socially deviant erotic attraction, that is, for the inter-ethnic marriage of Othello and Desdemona in Othello or for the courtship of Orlando and Ganymede in AYLI. Later in AYLI, Touchstone recounts an instance in which his lower status in court might “disable” him when he demonstrates the “Reply Churlish” of an imaginary courtier by describing how the former “disabled [Touchstone’s] judgement,” or disallowed Touchstone’s effectiveness as a judge (5.4.70-71). 
At the same time, what Valentine in The Two Gentlemen of Verona calls the “discourse of disability” can prove disingenuous, a common “association of disability with deceit” that Kevin Stagg and others have found in early modern rogue literature and that subjects disabled bodies to increased scrutiny (Stagg 23). The exchange begins when Valentine urges Sylvia to befriend Proteus warmly, for his sake. Sylvia dubs herself too “low [a] mistress” for Proteus, who in turn insists that he is too “mean a servant.” Impatient, Valentine interrupts demand that both  “Leave off discourse of disability,” and urges their swift acquaintance (2.4.99-102). For Valentine, “disability” is always feigned, a “discourse” or exercise: in this sense he sees more truly than he realizes, since Proteus, we later learn, “love[s Sylvia] too-too much” (198). In performance, Proteus’ and Sylvia’s excessive and false humility towards each other can mask Sylvia’s discomfort with Proteus’ evident admiration; a mutual; or Sylvia’s forced compliance with her lover’s demand to show “special favor” to his friend (94), which itself proleptically figures 5.4, when Valentine forgives Proteus for his attempted assault on Sylvia and instead outrageously makes a gift of her to his friend: “All that was mine in Silvia I give thee” (83). However the introduction of Sylvia to Proteus is played, their ambiguous lines treat “discourse of disability” as social camouflage, words of deficit uttered by able-bodied individuals in order to try to escape a predicament.
Sonnet 66 might seem to provide an exception to this rule of actively enabled disability (that is, to differ from these earlier situations in which a single, human individual is responsible for the transformation of predicament into disability). The narrator of Sonnet 66 complains its “strength [is] by limping sway disabled,” a phrase that potentially defines disability in medicalized terms, the halting gait of a strong body with an enfeebled limb or the disabled (limping) body in turn deforming or impairing an able-bodied one: 
Tyr’d with all these for restfull death I cry,
As to behold desert a begger borne,
And needie Nothing trimd in iollitie,
And purest faith vnhappily forsworne,
And gilded honor shamefully misplast,
And maiden vertue rudely strumpeted,
And right perfection wrongfully disgrac’d,
And strength by limping sway disabled,
And arte made tung-tide by authoritie,
And Folly (Doctor-like) controuling skill,
And simple-Truth miscalde Simplicity,
And captiue-good attending Captaine ill.
Tyr’d with all these, from these would I be gone,
Saue that, to dye, I leaue my loue alone. (Shakespeare E2v)
The sonnet seems to establish a body whose disabilities, in the medical narrative, fit it only for death: limited mobility (limping), inarticulacy (tongue-tying), mental illness (folly), cognitive difference (simplicity) and sickness (ill). In this sense the sonnet reiterates the dehumanizing able-bodied belief that associates bodily and cognitive impairment, culturally, with a life that is literally worth less than that of an able-bodied person. Moreover, phrases such as “strength by limping sway disabled” associate the abuse of power -- a moral evil -- with a physical impairment, in this case the non-normative gait of the power-hungry character “sway” (and it is hard not to imagine Shakespeare’s own Richard III, whose “halt[ing]” authority compels obedience and subordinates the able-bodied characters around him [1.1.23, 1.2.237]).
	The power and compassion of Sonnet 66 emerge, however, in the way it unexpectedly ascribes power to the imagined impaired beings who proceed through its lines; thus with irony and wit it draws our attention to the ways in which early modern life systematically took power away from real persons with disabilities and sentenced the halt and the lame to beggary, the tongue-tied to silence, the insane to restraints or institutionalization, and the cognitively different to ostracism. The metaphor of disability here does not solely reinforce a medical model of disability but also alerts us to the complex negotiations among impairments and disabilities (social, material, financial, bodily, sexual) that produce that “tired” lyric voice. In fact, the sonnet itself formally encodes the transformation, or rather, interaction, among impairments and disabilities. As Helen Vendler observes, the poem opens with a plaintive series of sufferers alone but in line 8 an unexpectedly early volta or turn, brings in the entities that inflict these injustices (308). We could even narrow down this turn to the word “disabled,” where the sonnet begins to blame the specific institutions that have turned impairment into disability or created impairment in the first place.
	The lyric speaker opens the poem with a definition of its own impairment, lacking rest or sleep, one of the six “non-naturals” in Galenic medicine that regulated bodily and humoral health. Then it lists the unfair material conditions or social impairments that have rendered that voice miserably exhausted at the very sight of the abject -- or occasionally elevated -- characters under discussion. Emergent mercantilism has “desert[ed]” those who most need financial support -- the “begger borne,” who will not inherit wealth, unlike the “Nothing[s]” or wealthy non-entities who are also in need of nothing. Purest faith, religious or marital, is either betrayed or turns apostate (the passive “forsworn” is deliberately ambiguous), so the institution of the church affords no protection. The aristocracy, or a noble patron, offers no reward, only “gilded honor,” the superficially attractive semblance of truth rather than solid virtue. Youthful sexuality is prostituted, and virtuous persons threatened with false accusations or “disgrac[e].” These institutions and places -- markets, churches, great houses, family homes -- have exerted improper “sway” or power over strength, art, skill, truth, and goodness. Paradoxically, however, lines 8-12 emphasize the fundamental strength, art, skill, truth, and good that exists within the seemingly “disabled,” “tongue-tied,” foolish, “simple,” and “ill.” Vendler notes that the sonnet brings back in line 11 the solitary sufferer, without a blameable agent, with “simple truth miscalled simplicity” (309). The sonnet does not establish a simple binary between physical impairment and socially-determined disability, but, to use Tom Shakespeare’s terms, simple truth finds itself in a “predicament,” moving interactively between these terms. The poem brings out parallels between terms of able-bodiedness and terms of disability through sounding the acoustic devices of alliteration, anaphora, and polyptoton: strength/sway, captive/captain, simple-truth/simplicity (the 1609 spelling emphasizes the closeness of Simple-Truth and Simplicity [own emphasis]). 
	Finally, although the couplet repeats the opening phrase of the poem, the sonnet’s final anaphora chooses life over death in an affirmation of the value of human lives that are impaired, disabled, deserted, forsworn, misplaced, disgraced, miscalled, captive, tired. The repeated phrase, “Tyr’d with all these” serves almost as repotia, the repetition of a phrase but with significant tonal differences, or as epistrophe, a repeated phrase that bookends a series of lines or clauses. It’s particularly appealing to think of that repeated phrase as repotia (literally, another drink: the speech given at a wedding feast), because it ushers in love. In original spelling, loue and lone are separated by one inverted print character. What makes precious the suffering, bragging, creating, caring characters of the sonnet, and the lyric speaker itself, are love, and the capacity to receive it. 
Sonnet 66 presents able-bodiedness, health, and happiness as contested terms. The “tired” and restless narrator craves “restfull death” but gives up its desire and consents to remain among the tongue-tied, the disabled, the fools, the simpletons, the captives, and among the needy nothings and Captains ill. This volume likewise negotiates all three terms of our title, directly or indirectly, in conversation with each other. Most scholarship on the subject of happiness in Shakespeare has concentrated upon eudaimonia, or the quest for the good and virtuous life, but this volume investigates instead how disability, health and happiness in Shakespeare come into being through the complex relations among bodies and their systems, rhetoric and objects, and also through character and genre. Essays are organized into three sections: Nation, Sex, and Emotion.

Section I: Nation
	Our first section engages disability, health, and happiness in light of rank and nation -- not just within the early modern appropriation of medieval political theory (the so-called doctrine of the monarch’s “two bodies”) but also within existing and emergent early modern discourses of civic and domestic health. Allison Hobgood addresses head-on the question of whether a disability studies framework risks reading Shakespeare anachronistically, and evaluates both existing scholarship on able-bodiedness in Shakespeare and the discourse of disability surrounding the recent discovery of the body of the historical King Richard III. She argues that Shakespeare’s Richard III itself both establishes and engages with an emergent early modern medicalized model for disability that is, importantly, both materially embodied and metaphorically rich. Her essay uses both presentist and historicist modes of criticism, discussing the performance of Peter Dinklage (2004), himself a person with restricted growth, as Richard III. Hobgood historicizes Richard’s body within an emerging rhetoric associating variant bodies with invisibility or anonymity, while Geoffrey Johns locates Shakespeare’s challenge to early modern ideas of disability within the diagnostic discourse of monstrosity circulating in England in the years between 1522-73. This discourse recognizes, Johns suggests, that sometimes monstrosity could trigger vicious, amoral, socially transgressive acts without a corresponding manifestation of physical signs -- in other words, a “monster” without a monstrous body. Shakespeare’s Richard emerges through this tradition of monstrous interpretation, Johns argues, explicitly and complexly to critique England’s national history -- specifically the hypocrisy and “diseased” state associated with the Wars of the Roses. 
	Sonya Loftis and Lisa Ulevich argue provocatively in favor of “reading Shakespeare through autism.” While Shakespeare’s characters might not meet the modern diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder, Loftis and Ulevich suggest that a variety of Shakespearean characters, particularly Hamlet and Coriolanus, share recognizable autistic traits, and that such traits, moreover, destroy or threaten to destroy empire itself. Patterns of power, disobedience, and compulsory able-bodiedness intersect complexly in King Lear, writes Amrita Dhar, in which the objections of Servant (so interpellated or hailed by Dhar as a moral agent in the action) to the blinding of Gloucester in the Folio make manifest the ways in which domestic subservience can demhumanize and disembody members of this body politic. Dhar’s essay begins with a caring act performed by a subordinate; Katherine Schaap Williams’ essay begins with a healing act performed by the King. Williams’ discussion of the “royal touch,” the cure of struma or scrofula by a reigning monarch, in Macbeth problematizes early and postmodern understandings of “cure” and “care.” Drawing upon disability theory, Williams argues that although the medicalization of the monarch’s body is intended to consolidate royal power, it draws attention instead to the ephemerality of the holy cure because the performance of healing depends upon physical contact. The literally tangible relation between subject and monarch, she finds, potentially undercuts notions of both cure and royalty. 
	Matthew Kozusko’s essay critiques the long-standing association between the study of Shakespeare and the civic and intellectual health of the nation. Although he argues that such a dynamic, in which a text is made sacred and invoked as a guideline for civic health, is both necessary and inevitable, he observes that such prescriptions deny the collaborative production of these texts and their meanings; cannot be proven empirically to be healthful; use Shakespeare as medicine for a critic or participant who is returned to health through reading; and might divert readers and thinkers from engagements that might improve the “health” of the nation in more profound or longer-lasting ways. This essay looks ahead to those in our final section, since it also addresses the question of whether Shakespeare can make us happy -- and what such happiness might mean.

Section II: Sex
	Our second section considers to what extent sex and gender function as disabilities, impairments, or predicaments in early modern England. Where Kozusko’s essay, in our previous section, indicates the indirect effects of Shakespeare upon national health, Hillary Nunn’s chapter recounts a fascinating episode of diagnosis through royal theatre, one that emphasizes the curative power of King James’s and Queen Elizabeth’s bodies and of the theatrical as humoral therapy in Hamlet. Nunn explores the sexualized gossip surrounding the Lake-Ros affair, in which the Countess of Exeter, renowned for her powers as a healer, was accused of administering a poisoned clyster or enema to the Lady Ros. So great was the scandal that the King himself intervened and attempted to reconstruct the alleged crime. Nunn suggests that the episode presents the consequences of striving to accommodate the body – to improve its functions and comfort – within early modern English society. Her essay thus interrogates the interplay among rank, sex or obscenity, and healthfulness in this period. Kate Doubler likewise deconstructs present-day understandings of sexed and healthy bodies by turning to the past. She contrasts the athletic figure of actor Will Kemp and the fictional body of Falstaff to demonstrate how notions of able-bodiedness and disability work to construct early modern masculinity. She thus shows us how Falstaff breaks down not only stable categories of gender (as others have noted) but also how he undoes both early modern anatomy and the hierarchy of muscle, fat, and flesh fetishized by our own era. 
	Floral imagery and botanical illustration in early modern England likewise present a normative model of human sexual maturation, writes Darlene Ciraulo. The vigor and well-being of the reproductive body visually mirrors the evolution of the flowering plant in its tripartite process of bud, blossom, and seedpod. What, she notes, is particularly interesting about this conventionally feminine floral analogy is its early modern application to the generative health of the male body as well. Reading female bodies in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Macbeth, Antony and Cleopatra and Cymbeline, Sujata Iyengar’s essay argues that these plays use air -- ubiquitous, invisible, contingently disease-spreading or health-bestowing -- to figure gender as both impairment and disability, or as the conversation between them.

Section 3: Emotion
	Nathaniel Smith opens our section on emotion in an essay that brings out good or bodily health as not only a vector for socializing gender but also something that is performed. He argues that Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew satirizes and parodies early modern discourses of humoral health precisely through this theatrical mechanism: Petruchio deploys early modern humoralism to “tame” Katharina even as it becomes evident that such therapies are merely excuses for bodily and political control. Ian Moulton continues to analyze the conflict between romantic love and happiness in Shakespeare by investigating the vexed relationship between erotic satisfaction and bodily health in early modern England. Love existed as a corporeal ailment in popular and medical treatises about human emotions; early modern thinkers wonder how lovers may retain their bodily equilibrium when seized by desire. Although today popular literature imagines romantic love to be necessary to happiness or fulfillment, Moulton’s essay argues that Twelfth Night, Romeo and Juliet, and Shakespeare’s sonnets imply that happiness and good health cannot coexist with romantic love. Moulton’s essay thus revisits the figure of the flower exquisitely analyzed by Ciraulo and, anticipates the compassionate reading of the image in light of early modern cancer-narratives that is offered by Alanna Skuse later in Section three. 
Ariane Balizet likewise uncovers a poignant connection between happiness and pain in her essay, which explores the depiction of wet-nursing in Shakespeare’s plays. Many wet-nurses lactated only because they recently lost or deserted their own infants, so that, Balizet suggests, the wet-nurse evokes both grief and sustenance in early modern households. The wet-nurse’s grief healed and strengthened her employer’s infant, and, Balizet argues, lactation might have provided the nurse with a way of coping with her own loss. Balizet’s essay considers Romeo and Juliet, The Winter’s Tale, Coriolanus, and Macbeth in order to examine the connection among the wet-nurse’s recovery from grief and the baby’s nourishment in order to argue that early modern readers and viewers imagined breastfeeding as health-giving for both nurse and infant. Finally, Alanna Skuse re-reads the figure of the rose as a trope with which to describe sexual and bodily corruption. She argues that the term canker, while recognised as referring to the “canker-worm,” a horticultural parasite, also had currency in its own time as referring to the disease of cancer, understood as a morbid disease that defied the curative efforts of surgeons and physicians, and to the “cancer-worm” sometimes supposed to cause this affliction. Skuse’s thoughtful, counter-intuitive reading emphasizes the beauty and fragility of the rose, and its association with healthy or normative sexuality and sexual development (as do Moulton and Ciraulo), but, she suggests, the canker-worm eats through body, flower, and metaphor. Slippage between the “canker worm” as a metaphorical and a somatic presence in these poems, she argues, reveals the extent to which the disease of cancer and the canker-worm in the flower problematize the boundary between self and other, figural and literal, sick and well.
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